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The world’s financial system is one of the globe’s most powerful structures, 
however the institutions that make up this network of banking firms are certainly not 
immune to the pressures of market globalization and technical innovation that drive 
change within the financial landscape. In order to exist within such an environment, the 
world’s largest commercial banks must constantly reevaluate the ways in which they 
function in order keep pace in the competitive market. The objective of this paper is to 
examine the efficiency of ten of the world’s largest commercial banks during the period 
spanning from 2006 to 2015. Utilizing a data envelopment analysis (DEA) output 
oriented model this study explores how these banking firms navigated the tumultuous 
landscape that was created at the hands of the most recent financial crisis. The study not 
only focuses on firm behavior during the crisis itself but the years surrounding the 
financial collapse as well, keying in on relationships between banking practices, and firm 
efficiency during a time of unethical conduct in the financial realm. The results show that 
the vast majority of banks reached peak efficiency following the crisis years (2007-2008) 
with a number of banks experiencing their lowest levels of technical efficiency during the 
crisis itself. Furthermore the most efficient banks in the sample were responsible for 
some of the era’s largest acquisitions, and there was no obvious trend that surfaced 
concerning the efficiency of domestic banks versus the efficiency of foreign banks. 
Coupling these results with the causes and implications of the globe’s most recent 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
  The world’s financial system is one of the globe’s most powerful 
structures, however the institutions that make up this network of banking firms are 
certainly not immune to the pressures of market globalization and technical innovation 
that drive change within the financial landscape. In order to exist within such an 
environment, the world’s largest commercial banks must constantly reevaluate the ways 
in which they function in order keep pace in the competitive market. It is imperative that 
they not only seek to further develop the disciplines in which they already excel but focus 
on how they can become more productive, efficient entities. In doing so these financial 
intermediaries will certainly be able to better function and adapt in a dynamic global 
financial market. 
The fact of the matter is that big banks are an essential piece of the economic 
puzzle holding trillions of dollars of assets at any given time. They are entities that 
promote growth, employ thousands and drive the economy forward, however it is not 
always smooth sailing for these massive financial intermediaries, as economic downturns 
and financial crises can push banks to their breaking point. In the most recent global 
crisis this reality was clearly illustrated through numerous government bailouts and the 
horror stories that surround firms such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. From 2007 
to 2008 the banking industry as a whole struggled to stay afloat, as the United States and 
numerous other nations faced off against one of the most significant economic recessions 
since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It is this severity that makes the period so 
intriguing; especially in the context of the world’s largest financial intermediaries who 
were eventually force to deal with the consequences of their unethical banking practices. 
	 2	
While the past decade, and more specifically the period characterized by the most 
recent financial crisis represents some of the world’s most financially strenuous years, 
research concerning bank performance during the time seems to be lacking. Due to the 
sheer impact that this recent era had on the entirety of the international economy, one 
would imagine that there would be significant trends that could be analyzed regarding the 
behavior of banks around the time of the financial collapse.  With that being said the 
objective of this study is to fill that research void in examining the efficiency of banks 
during the period stretching from 2005–2015. In doing so a DEA model will be 
constructed in order to explore how America’s largest banks reacted to changes in the 
financial landscape. The analysis will focus on the implications of the nation’s most 
recent financial crisis, keying in on the trends of bank efficiency that existed prior to, 
during and following the economic downturn of 2007. Like, Asmild, Paradi, Aggarwall 
and Schaffnit (2004) in their study of the Canadian banking industry this study will 
examine a period characterized by both a financial crisis and collapse in the real estate 
market. Utilizing data envelopment analysis (DEA) this examination of the world’s 
largest banks will key in on the efficiency of these firms, evaluating the relationship 
between the behavior of major banks and the global financial crisis itself.  
In measuring efficiency and output oriented DEA model will be constructed and a 
sample of ten of the world’s largest banks, exhibiting many of the same firm functions, 
will be examined. Data will be drawn from financial reports over a ten year period and 
the results that are derived will allow for an analysis of how efficiently each of the ten 
major banks functioned in relation to their peers. Furthermore, additional economic 
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concepts and accounting ratios will be utilized in order to provide further context to the 
discussion of bank efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper will be organized as follows. Beginning with an 
investigation of the existing literature, this analysis will first walk through what has 
already been explored when it comes to measuring the efficiency of banking systems. 
Following this review will be a discussion of the methodology behind the study followed 
by an explanation of the banking firms selected for analysis, along with the inputs and 
outputs that are utilized. With this background in place the results will then be presented 
along with the implications of the findings, allowing for an assessment of bank 















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Several previous works have been developed that focus on an efficiency analysis 
of a single banking structure or multiple banking systems. These studies focus on firms 
within nations in Asia, Europe, Australia and North America examining research 
questions concerning technological innovation, deregulation and the impact of financial 
conglomerates. Furthermore, the past literature on the subject evaluates both domestic 
and international banking structures, utilizing several different models and measures in 
order to draw valuable conclusions. A variety of these papers will be explained within 
this section and utilized as references to explain the steps and variables necessary to 
construct a model that will be able to effectively and accurately measure the efficiency of 
some of the globe’s largest banking firms.  
 While a DEA model will be utilized within this study it is not the sole method that 
has been implemented by researchers when exploring the efficiency measures of banks. 
In his study of banking efficiency in transition economies, Weill (2003) leans on a 
Stochastic Frontier approach, for instance, as the analysis explores the impact of foreign 
capital on forty-seven banks across Poland and the Czech Republic in the year 1997. It is 
due to this rather limited sample of DMUs (decision making units) that the study turns to 
a Stochastic Frontier approach, as DEA has the major drawback of increasing the number 
of efficient observations by default for a smaller sample. Moreover, the more typically 
used DEA method would not allow for Weill to take risk and environmental differences 
between both countries into account in a simple manner. Utilizing this methodology in 
order to construct a cost efficiency frontier, Weill discovers that, on average, foreign-
owned banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks, noting that variances in 
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efficiency scores did not result from differences in the size or scale of operations or from 
the structure of bank activities. 
 Weill (2003) is not the only researcher to have relied on a Stochastic Frontier 
approach as much of his methodology stemmed from a study constructed by Mester 
(1996) in which the efficiency of banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District 
were analyzed. Like Weill (2003), Mester (1996) made his methodology decision due to 
the fact that the focus of his investigation was centered on both the riskiness and quality 
of bank output, something that DEA could not simply analyze. While both of these 
studies utilized extremely similar methodologies in order to derive useful results, a 
stochastic approach is not without flaws, as demonstrated through an examination of the 
technique by Bezat (2009). Through the analysis it is noted that the Stochastic Frontier 
approach not only lacks the ability to predict technical efficiency scores of DMUs 
possessing multiple outputs, it also, much like DEA, can become less reliable when a 
small sample is utilized.  
 Despite these shortcomings, a Stochastic Frontier approach still holds value in its 
ability to account for risk and, in the case of Weill (2003), for environmental factors, 
however DEA seems to remain as the approach most often utilized within studies 
regarding banking systems. In an analysis conducted by Ferrier and Lovell (1990) the 
advantages of a DEA approach in the context of bank efficiency are discussed as the non-
parametric approach is compared to the stochastic technique discussed above. According 
to the study the two approaches oftentimes yield differing results, and while a non-
parametric programming approach, such as DEA, is often times criticized for reporting 
noise in the results as inefficiencies, it is also able to better accommodate a larger number 
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of DMUs and variables. This not only allows for study utilizing a DEA approach to 
evaluate a greater number of firms, it allows for a more thorough analysis of a DMU’s 
input and output measures.  
 This ability to construct a more extensive and in some cases more in depth study 
through the use of DEA can be clearly seen within the works of Yildirim (2002) and 
Haslem, Scheraga and Bedingfield (1996). In an analysis of the efficiency of commercial 
banks within Turkey Yildrim (2002) is able to evaluate a rather large sample of some 594 
observations as opposed to the much smaller sample of 47 observations in the study 
constructed by Weill (2003). Through a DEA analysis it is discovered, not only that 
efficiency varied widely throughout the period stretching from 1988 to 1994 but the 
banking sector in Turkey also suffered from scale inefficiencies most often. Moreover, 
there were distinct differences in efficiency scores depending on firm ownership, as state 
owned banks displayed greater efficiency than both privately owned and foreign owned 
firms. Like Yildrim (2002), Haslem, Scheraga and Bedingfield (1996), were able to 
effectively utilize the ability of DEA to accommodate a more elaborate study, 
constructing a model that took a total of seven inputs and five outputs. In taking several 
more variables into account Haslem, Scheraga and Bedingfield (1996), had the ability to 
develop a more multifaceted model that would be used to examine the best practices for 
large banks in the United States. While most studies solely focus on deposits, and interest 
or non-interest expenses and income this analysis takes on more specific variables 
including total borrowed funds, labor expenses and loans to foreign borrowers. In doing 
so Haslem, Scheraga and Bedingfield (1996), found that in 1987 “best practice” or most 
efficient banks were actually found to be “financially bad practice banks”, however by 
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1992 banks deemed to be most efficient through DEA analysis were also considered to be 
the “financially best practice” banks. 
 While each of these studies does, in fact, display a benefit of utilizing DEA 
analysis in the context of banking efficiency, this is by no means the only strength of the 
linear programming approach. Being a non-parametric approach data envelopment 
analysis can be utilized within a number of different settings, making the approach a 
rather dynamic one. As a result DEA studies concerning bank efficiency are not limited 
to addressing a domestic banking system, as illustrated through the studies of Yildrim 
(2002), and Haslem et al. (1996). Pastor, Perez and Quesada (1997) for instance, 
constructed an analysis that compared the efficiency measures of banks across nations 
including the United States, and countries throughout Europe. Utilizing a DEA model 
under the assumptions of a production approach, in which deposits are viewed as an 
output, the study found scale inefficiencies within the United States, Austria and 
Germany. Furthermore, a Malmquist index was utilized in order to compare the nations 
in the sample, showing France, Belgium and Spain to be the most efficient, while banks 
within the United Kingdom, Austria and Germany were found to be least efficient.  
 While these results provide a rather detailed picture of how banking systems 
compare in the international community, there are certainly limitations to the conclusions 
that can be drawn. In selecting inputs and outputs Pastor et al. (1997) lean on variables 
with rather wide definitions, utilizing the inputs of interest and non-interest income and 
the outputs of loans and deposits. Due to the fact that this study explores a diverse set of 
nations, this somewhat vague set of input and output variables could potentially lead to 
less precise results. This degree of error could potentially be minimized however, through 
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the use of a sample characterized by more comparable banking structures, as is the case 
in a study completed by Paleckova (2017). Through an analysis of financial 
conglomerates within the Visegrad Countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and 
Poland) a slight drop in average efficiency between 2009 and 2011 is uncovered, as 
Paleckova (2017) displays that banks within financial conglomerates are, in fact, more 
efficient despite the recent decrease in productivity. Utilizing a model similar to that of 
Pastor et al. (1997) this study takes a slightly different approach focusing on the inputs of 
labor, fixed assets, and deposits along with outputs that include loans and net interest 
income, in order to explore how the structure of individual banking firms effect their 
efficiency. 
 While Paleckova (2017) focuses on the internal structure of banking firms in 
terms of efficiency, several other analyses give more attention to the environment in 
which banks must function. One study constructed by Xiaogang, Skully and Brown 
(2005) keys in on the external factors that surrounded the Chinese banking industry at the 
turn of the century, for instance, evaluating the impact of the government’s deregulation 
programs. Utilizing inputs that include firm expenses and outputs comprised of deposits, 
loans and income, a DEA analysis under constant returns of scale was implemented in 
order to uncover X-inefficiencies within the banking sector. Through the analysis it was 
discovered that large state-owned banks and smaller banks were more efficient than 
medium sized Chinese banks. Moreover, the examination into the deregulatory measures 
demonstrates that the programs employed by the Chinese government did in fact improve 
overall cost efficiency within the sample of forty-three banks. While the results display in 
improvement in efficiency following 1995, there was a gradual drop in overall efficiency 
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stretching from 1997 until 2000, most likely triggered by the aftermath of the Asian 
financial crisis that occurred in 1997.  
 Like Xiaogang, Skully and Brown (2005), Kirkwood and Nahm (2003) also 
centered the focus of their study around the impact of government regulation on a 
domestic banking system. There is, however, one rather significant difference in the fact 
that Kirkwood and Nahm (2003) not only explore banking efficiency during an era of 
deregulation, the study also analyzes the relationship that a firm’s efficiency score have 
on the behavior of its shares in the market. In an analysis of ten firms in the Australian 
banking sector a two-model approach was employed, in which both models took the same 
input variables but differing output variables. While the cost efficiency model took 
interest bearing assets and non-interest income as outputs, the profit efficiency model 
analyzed profit after taxes as the only output. When coupled with the use of a Malmquist 
index this study yielded results that displayed an increase in the efficiency of large banks 
and a decrease in the profit efficiency of regional banks. Furthermore, the Malmquist 
index indicated that technological change was the primary cause of improvements in total 
factor productivity over the period. When turning to the implications of these results on a 
firm’s share price Kirkwood and Nahm (2003) discovered that there was a positive 
relationship that existed between bank efficiency and share price for the sample that was 
analyzed. 
 Supporting these results discovered by Kirkwood and Nahm (2003), Fadzlan, 
Zulkhibri and Majid (2007) also uncovered a connection between share price and bank 
efficiency through a study of just six commercial banks in Singapore between 1993 and 
2003. Unlike the Australian study, this analysis only utilizes a single DEA model that 
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took the inputs of deposits and interest expenses and output variables that included loans 
and interest income. With this model in place the analysis was able to generate results 
that displayed an average efficiency of approximately 95.4% across the small sample of 
firms analyzed. According to the study, this overall efficiency score, while high, suggests 
that there is an input waste of 4.6%, meaning that firms within the sample on average are 
not employing the inputs they use in the best possible manner. When it comes 
interoperating these results in regards to the individual firms themselves, the analysis 
found that smaller banks outperformed their larger counterparts, however it is noted that 
the study would require further analysis of firms risk exposures in order to paint a 
thorough picture of banking sector efficiency.  
The implications of the limitations of Fadzlan, Zulkhibri and Majid (2007) can 
certainly be seen as well, specifically through the results themselves and the conclusions 
that are drawn from them. The firm Tat Lee Bank (TBL), for instance, boasts the second 
highest mean efficiency score out of the six banks that were evaluated, however it is the 
only firm within the sample to boast negative share returns. While this is the case, the 
study does note a potential reason for this result that falls in line with the limitations that 
the researchers discuss at the conclusion of the paper. According to Fadzlan, Zulkhibri 
and Majid (2007) TBL’s fall in share prices could have been due to investors concern 
over the banks exposure to troubled companies in Indonesia suffering due to the Asian 
Financial Crisis. This argument not only could explain the drop in TBL’s stock it also 
lines up with the fact that the study did not address the degree of risk that the banks 
within the sample were exposed to. 
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While a number of prior studies address topics including stock returns, 
government deregulation and the internal structures of banking firms, many of these same 
studies, also reference financial crises in order to explain their results. Although 
economic downturns certainly are useful when adding context to the results of an 
efficiency study, financial crises have also been the primary focus of various modern 
DEA studies. Due to the impact that the pressures of globalization and financial 
innovation have had on the industry in the past decades, analyses of bank behavior during 
times of crises have become more significant than ever leading some researchers to 
evaluate these rather chaotic eras. In a study constructed by Asmild, Paradi, Aggarwall 
and Schaffint (2004), for instance, two of the most recent recessions to plague the 
Canadian banking industry are analyzed. A DEA window analysis and Malmquist index 
are utilized to explore a twenty-year period between 1981 and 2000, a time when the 
economic climate in Canada was changing. Exploring a sample of eight Schedule I and 
forty-nine Schedule II and III banks this analysis confirms that the recent recessions and 
collapse of the Canadian real estate market had, in fact, negatively impacted the overall 
efficiency of the banking sector. Moreover, an increased variance between the banks’ 
performance in the latter part of the 1990s, is likely to have been caused by the regulatory 
changes brought on by the Canadian Bank Act amendments implemented in 1987. While 
this analysis certainly focused on the sector as a whole Asmild et al. (2004) were also 
able to explore the functions of individual banks during the period analyzed, noting that 
certain actions such as ScotiaBank’s acquisition of Montreal Trust in 1994 may have 
negatively impacted firm efficiency during the years to follow.  
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Similarly a study conducted by Fadzlan (2009) takes a look at the behavior of 
banks during the Asian financial crisis of 1997, however in this case an international 
examination is constructed. Moreover, Fadzlan (2009) implements a three-model analysis 
in which the intermediation, value-added and operating approach are each utilized. As a 
result a total of five outputs and three inputs are examined and allocated to each model 
based upon the parameters of each specific approach. While the intermediation approach 
takes deposits as an input variable, the value added approach assumes deposits are an 
output produced by labor capital and interest expenses. Unlike either of these two 
methods the operating approach does not take deposits as a variable, analyzing only the 
inputs of interest expense and labor along with the output variables of interest and non-
interest income. When conducted this analysis would also divide results into three 
specific periods in order to differentiate the pre-crisis, post-crisis and crisis year(s). With 
the crisis year occurring in 1997 the remaining two periods would encompass the years of 
1992–1996 and 1998–2003. 
Not surprisingly the results derived through Fadzlan (2009) point out a rather high 
degree of inefficiency within the banks of Thailand and Malaysia, particularly in the 
initial year following the crisis (1998). With this being said, technical efficiency within 
the Malaysian sector during the post crisis years was highest under the intermediation and 
value added approaches, while the Thailand sector experienced rather low technical 
efficiency across all three models following the financial collapse. In both cases, 
however, the operating approach exhibited the highest levels of technical efficiency 
during the entirety of the period analyzed (1992-2003), most likely due to the structure of 
the model itself. According to the study, banks were most likely able to still manage to 
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boost their deposit base in order to produce interest and non-interest incomes, thereby 
recording a greater degree of TE under the operating approach. When it comes to 
Malaysian banks in particular, it was found that the most efficient firms were those that 
had greater “loan intensity” and a higher proportion of income stemming from non-
interest sources. On the other hand it was also discovered that both size expense 
preference behavior and liquidity all had a negative relationship with efficiency in the 
Malaysian sector. These results carried over into the banking system of Thailand for the 
most part as well, however in the Thai sector, size was actually found to have a positive 
relationship with bank efficiency.  
While each of these prior studies targets unique and varying topics regarding bank 
efficiency, the research on the subject has been lacking as of late. According to a study 
developed by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) financial innovation has simply 
outpaced efficiency research concerning X-efficiency or DMU deviations from the 
frontier. While Berger et al. (1993) note that scale and scope efficiencies have been 
extensively studied, these measure are only able to explain approximately five percent of 
the costs that are caused by inefficiencies. An X-efficiency analysis, such as DEA, on the 
other hand is able to uncover about twenty percent of these same costs created by 
banking inefficiencies. Despite the fact that Berger et al. (1993) does in fact note that the 
majority of studies concerning banking efficiency have focused on the United States this 
trend no longer seems to be the case. The fact of the matter is the vast majority of 
analyses concerning the United States were published prior to the turn of the century, 
despite the recent events that have plagued the financial market in the past decade.  
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It is this apparent hole that exists within the research that this study will attempt to 
fill, concentrating on a more modern, complex and more strictly regulated system of 
banks functioning within the global economy. Like the studies discussed within this 
section, this analysis will also utilize a DEA approach in order to measure bank 
efficiency. Furthermore, the bank data itself will be picked apart, as this examination of 
banking firms will connect the efficiency measures derived through the DEA program to 
actions taken by the sample of firms throughout the decade analyzed. The most 
significant difference between this current study and the majority of papers previously 
discussed lies in the period being analyzed, as the vast majority of efficiency studies 
regarding banks have focused on periods between 1985 and 2003. This analysis on the 
other hand will explore a more modern period with a goal somewhat similar to that of 
Asmild, Paradi, Aggarwall and Schaffnit (2004) who evaluated the Canadian sector 
through two recessions and a real estate crisis.  
While this study will surely utilize some of the characteristics of previous works, 
the methodology as a whole will certainly be rather unique. Like Fadzlan (2009) a multi-
model approach will be taken, however only two models will be utilized and will employ 
both the intermediation and production technique, disregarding the operational approach. 
This is due to the fact that the operational approach utilized within Fadzlan (2009) 
completely ignores deposits or assets, arguably the most significant variable within a 
bank efficiency study as they allow a banking firm to lend and invest. Furthermore, this 
study will focus strictly on the largest commercial banks within the modern global 
financial system, as opposed to those analyses that evaluate banks of various size, 
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purpose and financial standing such as Xiaogang, Skully and Brown do in their study of 
the Chinese banking system. 
This brief synopsis of the literature that exists concerning banking efficiency 
essentially raises two key points. First off the majority of studies concerning banking 
efficiency are outdated and analyze firms prior to the year 2000, despite the fact these 
same banks have become significantly more complex since the turn of the century. And 
second, there seems to be a correlation between economic downturns and overall bank 
efficiency as displayed by the studies of Asmild, Paradi, Aggarwall and Schaffnit (2004) 
and Fadzlan (2009) along with a handful of other studies. The goal of this study is to 
analyze this relationship in the context of a modern banking structure, evaluating how 
banks reacted to the most recent financial collapse. In doing so ten of the largest banks 
across the globe will be evaluated, measured and compared to one another as this analysis 













 Efficiency is a state that any firm or organization, regardless of purpose or 
industry, should strive for in order to achieve the highest degree of competitiveness in the 
market. The fact of the matter, however is that there are a limited number of resources 
available for firms to utilize in order to progress towards this goal of success within any 
industry. As a result, decisions must be made regarding the allocation of specific 
resources within a given firm or organization, in order to allow that body to operate as 
efficiently as possible. In the financial world this pursuit of competitiveness is arguably 
more ferocious than it is in any other sector, as the world’s largest banks contend for 
trillions of dollars constantly present within the international market. Consequently 
banking firms throughout the world face the challenge of where and how to allocate 
capital, labor and resources on a consistent basis according to the behavior of these global 
markets. It is this fact that makes efficiency the vital characteristic that it is, allowing 
banking firms to confidently apportion the limited resources they have in a manner that 
results in firm growth, stability and profitability. 
Introduced in 1978 by Charnes et al. (1978), data envelopment analysis has 
become one of the standard non-parametric approaches for such an efficiency analysis, 
utilizing a sequence of linear programming problems in order to calculate an efficiency 
score. Through the use of this method an efficiency frontier is developed by a locus of 
points representing the decision-making units (DMUs) exercising optimal practices, 
considered to be “role models” to their peers (Coffey 2017). With the ability to 
accommodate multiple inputs and outputs data envelopment analysis is able to derive a 
comprehensive efficiency measure based upon an entire given set of data points. 
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Moreover, the peer-to-peer comparison allows for an examination of how a given DMU 
or firm is performing as compared to other entities that function within the same market. 
Such a comparison can be crucial as well, especially in markets saturated with competing 
firms that all seek to perform in the most profitable and cost effective manner possible. In 
striving to do so DEA can act as a guide, pointing to the areas where adjustments could 
be made, all while providing projected input and output values that would pull a firm 
towards a perfect efficiency score. 
 In order for a firm to reach a point of efficiency an input oriented or output 
oriented approach may be employed depending on the goals of that specific decision 
making unit.  While an input oriented approach functions in a manner that allows a firm 
to determine how significantly a set of inputs can contract while maintaining the same 
level of output the output oriented approach works in the opposite manner focusing on 
potential output given a consistent set of inputs. Due to the competitive nature of the 
financial sector coupled with the vast amount of capital that exists within the worlds 
largest banking firms, this study will utilize the output-oriented approach focusing on 
output expansion as opposed to input contraction. Figure 1 shows this methodology 
graphically through the total product curve, which represents the unique relationship 
between a firm’s maximal output and minimal input combinations. When a firm is able to 
achieve such a relationship it is deemed to be at a point of technical efficiency, as 
represented by Points A, B and C in Figure 1, while point E is not technically efficient as 
it resides below the curve. Therefore point E would need to move to point E* in order to 
exemplify an efficient point, as a result increasing its technical efficiency, as illustrated 
by the dashed line on the diagram.  
	 18	
 While the output-oriented model focuses on maximizing a DMU’s output it 
allows for the identification of input slacks as well providing a firm with an illustration of 
how inputs could be more efficiently utilized in order to reach a level of maximum 
output. Such a slack can be seen within Figure 1 presented below, as both point B and 
point E* are each characterized by the same level of output (Y) yet not the same level of 
input (X). While point E* is, in fact, a technically efficient point achieving maximum 
 
output the bracketed area between points B and E* displays the input slack between the 
two points. More specifically, this bracketed area or gap between points B and E* 
illustrates the fact that a firm at point E* could produce the same level of output (Y) at 
point B while utilizing fewer inputs (X) or resources in the process. In this case point E* 
is considered to be at a Farrell Efficient point, or a point of efficiency on a horizontal, flat 
portion of the frontier, while point B is at a point of total or Koopman Efficiency (Coffey 
2017) The same holds true for output slack which, in this case is represented by a 
movement from point D to point A. In this case however, the gap on the vertical, flat 
portion of the frontier represents the degree by which output (Y) could increase while the 
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In the output-oriented model (Model 1) illustrated below in Figure 2 variable 
returns to scale (VRS) are assumed, and the linear programming problem is displayed in 
matrix form. Each set of matrices is derived based upon the quantity of inputs and outputs 
being examined in the analysis, with the unknown weight terms (z) corresponding to the 
number of DMUs being observed in the study and the (k) term referring to the specific 
DMU being examined. These weight terms in the formulation below signify the peer 
weights of the left side of lines (1) and (2) determining which DMUs will act as role 
models, such as point B in Figure 1 which acts as a role model for the inefficient point E. 
 
Figure 2: Output Oriented DEA Model in Matrix Form 
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Through this model the technical efficiency of DMU k will be calculated, a value that 
will reside between 0 and 1, with the value of 1 representing a firm that has achieved 
efficiency. In Figure 1 if a firm functions at Point E possessing an efficiency score of 
0.750, for instance, that firm would be described as having 75% technical efficiency. 
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Point E*, on the other hand, would represent an efficiency score of 1 or perfect technical 
efficiency, with Point B demonstrating perfect Koopmann efficiency. In the Linear 
Programing formulation below the unknown ! represents this efficiency score, residing 
on line (1) due to the fact that it is an output-oriented model. It is expected that these 
technical efficiency scores of most of the banking firms analyzed will be relatively low 
during the years prior to and during the financial crisis itself and closer to a score of 1 or 
perfect efficiency following the crisis, as institutions worked to recover from the global 
financial collapse. 
This linear programming problem is characterized by a set of constraints each of 
which are displayed in the LP formulation presented above. The left side of inequalities 
(1) and (2) represent the efficiency frontier, that are constructed from the DMUs in the 
sample, while the right portion of these two inequalities denotes the specific DMU being 
analyzed. The difference between lines (1) and (2) is in the fact that the first inequality 
represents the set of outputs (y) that are examined through the study, along with the 
unknown ! term, while line (2) presents the set of all inputs (x) that are being analyzed. 
The inequalities are in opposite direction due to the fact that the left side of the inequality 
represents the frontier, which will have equal or greater outputs than the single firm being 
analyzed on the right side of the inequality. The same holds true when it comes to inputs 
as well, as the frontier will have input quantities that are less than or equal to that of the 
single firm being examined. This is the case due to the fact that a firm on the frontier 
would not be able to act as a role model if it was to produce a lesser output and utilize 
higher inputs than the single firm being analyzed. Line (3) represents an additional 
constraint that exists under variable returns to scale as each of the non-negative DMU 
	 21	
weight (z) terms must sum to one, while line (4) displays the LP problem’s final 
constraint requiring that these same weight terms be non-negative. Through this 
formulation, the efficiency scores and efficient peers of specific banking firms will be 
determined allowing for an analysis of each decision making unit when it is compared to 




















IV. EMPERICAL RESULTS 
Sample and DEA Models 
This study examines 10 of the world’s largest banking firms over a period of 10 
years spanning from 2006 to 2016 resulting in a total of 100 decision-making units. Out 
of these 100 observations 2 were determined to be outliers due to the fact that they 
possessed outputs that differed drastically from the rest of the sample resulting in a final 
sample of 98 banking firms. Furthermore this analysis contains a total of 6 variables 
divided into inputs and output amongst two different models constructed based upon the 
production and intermediation approaches. Inputs include employees, as well as both 
interest and non-interest expenses while outputs include interest income and non-interest 
revenue. The final variable incorporated within the study is total assets, which behaves as 
either an input or as an output depending on the model being utilized. While the 
intermediation approach (Model 1) assumes assets are an input as banks attempt to 
transform liabilities to loans, the production approach takes assets as an output alongside 
both revenue components. 
Each of the 6 variables was derived from the given firm’s annual 10K report filed 
at the request of the SEC and were recorded in terms of millions of dollars with the 
exception of employees which was converted to millions of employees in order to 
establish a uniform set of measures. The goal of these variables was to capture the 
activities of each major banking firm without screwing the results towards entities that 
leaned heavily on specific activities in order to generate revenue. In other words, the 
objective of this study was not to grade banking firms on their performance in the realm 
of investment banking or on their success in sales and trading or real estate markets, but 
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to evaluate firms at a higher level based upon overall expenses, resources and revenue. In 
order to capture expenses interest and non-interest income measures were employed to 
account for both interest payable on any borrowings, and operating expenses such as 
employee compensation, technology expenses and legal fees. On the other side of the  
spectrum interest and non-interest income were utilized in order to measure inflows, not 
by department but as an aggregate of all firm revenues including those gained through 
operating activities or generated through the lending of firm resources. Within this study 
these resources were represented through a measurement of a bank’s total assets, while 
the final variable, employees, captured the degree of human capital utilized within a firm, 
a measure that would not be recognized otherwise.  
Figure 3, presented below displays the distribution of descriptive statistics across 
the sample of banks examined, including minimum, and maximum figures, alongside 
measures of mean, standard deviation and covariance. These measures not only display  
 
the basic features of the sample as a whole, they allow for a simple or high-level analysis 
of the given dataset allowing for the discovery of correlations between variables. 
Goldman Sachs, for instance, in 2006 possesses the lowest employee count by a rather 
significant amount yet still earned interest income and non-interest revenue that fall 
Figure 3: Input / Output Descriptive Statistics 2006 – 2015 (98 Observations) 
Input / Output Min Max Avg. SD CV 
Assets (mil) 473,440  3,808,278 1,606,576 708,752  44.116 
Employees (hundreds) 30,900  375,000 165,739 98,959  59.707 
Interest Expenses (mil) 2,742  91,737 19,478 17,088  87.729 
Non-Int. Expenses (mil) 10,139  77,090 36,492 16,620  45.545 
Interest Income (mil) 5,209  121,347 44,025 25,940  58.921 
Non-Int. Income (mil) 11,826  72,534 32,828 11,820  36.006 
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around the sample averages. While the degree of employees a bank retains does not seem 
to directly impact revenue earned it certainly impacts operating expenses within a firm as 
exhibited by Citigroup in 2007. With some 375,000 employees Citigroup possessed the 
largest quantity of employees in the sample, and did so just prior to the financial collapse, 
paying out operating expenses that totaled to two times the average amount paid by its 
peers. Additionally banks such as Bank of America and JP Morgan which have asset 
totals that exceed the average also, justifiably, possess interest income figures that are 
well above the average and move in almost perfect correlation with increases or 
decreases in total assets. This trend also seems to hold up within the firms with a lower 
degree of assets as well, as exhibited by Morgan Stanley who sees interest income fall 
from approximately $44 billion in 2006 to the minimum interest income within the 
sample, at just under $5 billion, by 2013 as total assets decreased by about $288 billion 
during that same period.  
Outside of the realm of simple inputs and outputs additional connections can be 
drawn through exploring firms’ return on assets (ROA) the percentage of profit a 
company earns in relation to its overall resources. Figure 4 displayed below presents the 
descriptive statistics for this financial ratio displaying the minimum, maximum and the 
average measures for the sample of firms analyzed. When examining ROA for the sample 
as a whole it is evident the vast majority of firms saw a decrease in profitability during 
the financial crisis, with many of those firms failing to return to their pre-crisis levels of 
Figure 4: ROA Descriptive Statistics 2006 – 2015 (98 Observations) 
Ratio Min Max Avg. 
Return on Assets 2% 10% 5% 
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ROA following the collapse. Barclays, who hovered around 2% - 3% during the 10-year 
period analyzed, exhibited the lowest level of ROA within the sample. While the UK 
based firm possessed asset quantities above the average throughout the period analyzed, 
revenue figures decreased during the same period as both interest and non-interest 
income dropped below the sample average. Furthermore the DEA analysis uncovered the 
fact that Barclays was operating with increasing returns to scale for the majority of the 
years analyzed, revealing that output would increase by an amount that would exceed a 
proportional change in inputs. This illustrates the fact that Barclays is not operating at its 
optimal size and would benefit from further growth. This could be looked at from a 
different perspective as well, however, as it is difficult for banks to escape increasing 
returns to scale and achieve optimal size. This is due to the fact that growth tends to leave 
banking firms with a greater quantity of assets once again providing more room to grow, 
creating a recurring loop that could always leave a bank chasing optimal size. On the 
other side of the spectrum, or the most profitable firm in terms of ROA on the was Wells 
Fargo in 2006 with an ROA of 10%  The firm was able to translate the second smallest 
asset base in the sample into revenue figures well in excess of the minimum values found 
in the data set. This level of ROA did not stick however, as the percentage trailed off 
during and following the financial crisis as the firm’s asset base grew without a 
corresponding increase in revenue. The most consistently successful firm on the basis of 
ROA was Citigroup, as the bank was able to maintain a ratio that grew too as large as 8% 
and never fell below 5% as Citi was able to maintain profitability even as the financial 
crisis chipped away at the firm’s total assets.  
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 While these relationships are able to tell a portion of the story, they are not able to 
provide the comprehensive examination of firm efficiency that data envelopment analysis 
is able to offer. In order to capture both the production and intermediation approaches  
discussed prior two models were developed, one that takes assets as an input and a 
second that assumes assets to be an output as displayed in Figure 5 below. While each  
Figure 5: Models for DEA Analysis 
Model Inputs   Outputs 
Model 1 




















model will be output oriented and analyzed under variable returns to scale (VRS) the 
behavior of each model will differ with a change in methodologies. A of the few firms 
analyzed such as HSBC, for instance, saw a much less significant change in total assets 
throughout the period analyzed, while Morgan Stanley, for example, saw total assets fall 
considerably from 2006 to 2015. When taken as an output in Model 2 rather than an input 
as in Model 1 efficiency scores increased almost uniformly as hundreds of billions and 
often times trillions of dollars are introduced as an output alongside much smaller 
revenue components. With this being said both models certainly serve a purpose as each 
one represents a different approach to evaluating banking firms, representing methods 
that are often times used but rarely are compared within the same study. 
Findings 
 The results of the DEA formulation discussed in Section III reveal that efficiency 
scores, while high in certain instances, certainly did fluctuate as the global economy 
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moved into and then out of the world’s most recent financial crisis. It is evident through 
the data presented in Appendix A that not all firms were characterized by persistently 
high levels of efficiency as the financial collapse took hold and left behind a broken and 
battered economy. Citigroup, despite a blemish in 2008, can be considered to be one of 
the most consistently efficient firms analyzed, achieving efficiency scores above 0.900 
each of the ten years examined across both of the two models. Furthermore Citigroup in 
2010 is a frequently utilized efficient peer referenced a total of 10 times in model 1, but 
only a total of 7 times in model 2. While there is certainly some consistency in the 
performance of Citi during the decade encircling the financial crisis, the firm was not 
able to entirely avoid the implications of the collapse in 2008. While this DMU 
(Citigroup 2008) is an outlier within the dataset, due to the fact that the DEA program 
cannot take on a negative output (a loss in non-interest revenue), the firm performance 
during the year by no means conveys efficient behavior at a glance. Despite this stumble 
the firm bounced back achieving almost perfect technical efficiency (0.968) by the year 
2014 as revenue increased while employees and interest expenses were cut drastically. 
Such a bounce back could potentially be attributed to the fact that the firm was 
characterized by perfectly efficiency or near perfectly efficiency behavior across both 
models in the two years leading up to the global crisis in 2008.  
 Citigroup was not alone in its success either, as HSBC almost mirrored the 
consistency of its American based counterpart. The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation was arguably the most efficient firm in the sample however, as the firm was 
able to avoid a major falter in 2008 unlike Citigroup who saw revenue plummet during 
the crisis year. Possessing technical efficiency scores that consistently exceeded 0.900 
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across both models during the decade analyzed, HSBC appeared to pass through the 
financial collapse with minimal hardship. With the ability to maintain a massive asset 
base the firm was able consistently attain revenue figures that were well above average, 
achieving perfect technical efficiency in 2007, 2009 and 2013 in model 1 (production) 
and 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 in model 2 (intermediation). Moreover HSBC, in 2009, 
acts as one of the most efficient peers in model 1, as the DMU is utilized on 13 occasions 
during a year where the majority of banking firms in the sample saw their own efficiency 
scores take a fall. Aside from a gradual decrease in both interest income and interest 
expense HSBC saw very few significant changes in the variables analyzed, as the firm 
moved rather steadily through the globe’s most recent financial downturn. 
 Citigroup and HSBC were not the only firms able to function at higher efficiency 
levels however, as banks such as Bank of America and Goldman Sachs saw efficiency 
levels climb following the financial crisis. When it comes to Bank of America this rise in 
efficiency levels is more significant within model 2 than it is within model 1, as Bank of 
America’s most notable strength following the crisis appears to be the firm’s ability to 
maintain the growth of its asset base much like HSBC. Since the intermediation approach 
(model 2) takes assets as an output within and adopts an output-oriented approach this 
increase in total assets carries more weight within the confines of model 2. This is not to 
say that Bank of America does not perform with high levels of efficiency in both models, 
however, as the firm slowly pulls its technical efficiency levels back over 0.900 by 2013 
in model 2 and by 2015 in model 1 after a slight dip in 2012. Goldman Sachs had a 
similar path through the financial crisis, however the firm’s success in terms of efficiency 
does not seem to be derived through asset growth but through limiting the number of 
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individuals employed at the firm. During 2006 for instance Goldman posses the fewest 
number of employees of any DMU analyzed within the sample, while maintaining 
revenue figures that hovered around the sample average. As a result the firm achieved a 
perfect efficiency score in 2006 across both models and this trend would continue 
through 2009 where the firm again achieved perfect technical efficiency across both 
models acting as the most frequently utilized efficient peer in model 1. This stretch of 
success would be briefly interrupted in 2010 as the efficiency scores in model 1 and 
model 2 would drop to 0.881 and 0.973 respectively, a small slip that would only last 
temporarily as the firm would return to its pre-crisis efficiency figures by the end of the 
period analyzed. 
 Likewise, Wells Fargo and JP Morgan also exhibit high levels of efficiency 
throughout the decade analyzed, however neither firm is quite as proficient as HSBC over 
the period. Never the less, JP Morgan and Wells Fargo are two of the more efficient firms 
within the sample, as each bank achieves perfect technical efficiency on multiple 
occasions. JP Morgan achieves this milestone in consecutive years as well, in 2009 and 
2010, directly following the crisis years. This not only demonstrations that the firm was 
able to rebound from its lowest efficiency scores, occurring in 2008, it also displays the 
bank’s ability to maintain efficient behavior as JP Morgan never again saw efficiency 
scores slip back down to the level they were at in 2008. Furthermore, JP Morgan 
possesses one of the most frequently utilized peers within the sample, as the firm’s 
performance in 2009 is referenced by other DMUs on 20 occasions in model 1 
(production) and a total of 16 times within model 2 (intermediation). One of the many 
firms to reference this DMU was Wells Fargo, as the firm utilized the efficient peer (JP 
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Morgan 2009) on four different occasions in model 2. Moreover, the two banks share a 
relatively similar trend in efficiency scores as both firms see efficiency levels remain 
consistently high during the latter portion of the decade. Wells Fargo, while achieving 
solid efficiency scores, also exhibited the highest levels of return on assets during the 
early part of the decade as the bank is one of the few in the sample who saw a consistent 
and significant growth in total assets from 2006 to 2015. This growth in the asset base 
coupled with diminishing expanse figures and rising revenue allowed Wells Fargo to 
maintain some of the strongest scores for technical efficiency under the assumptions of 
both the production and intermediation methods. 
 While the firms discussed previously exhibited the same or at least a similar trend 
in efficiency across both the intermediation and production models, this was not the case 
amongst all firms analyzed. Barclays for instance, saw a large discrepancy between 
models 1 and 2 as the firm passed through the years that encompassed the global 
financial crisis. In model 2 (intermediation method), for instance, the European based 
firm exhibits a trend very much similar to that of Bank of America or Goldman Sachs as 
efficiency scores persist at a high level with the exception of a small dip in 2013. Despite 
this small blemish Barclay’s large asset base throughout the majority of the decade 
analyzed allowed the firm to achieve perfect technical efficiency in 2008 and 2010 under 
the intermediation method, an accomplishment that the firm was not even close to 
attaining under the assumptions of model 1 (production method). In model 1 the contrary 
is the case as Barclays saw scores plummet following the crisis as technical efficiency 
fell as low as 0.758 by 2015, one of the lowest scores present within the sample. This 
drastic difference can most likely be explained by once again examining the firm’s return 
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on assets as the latter portion of the decade saw Barclays asset base only slightly decrease 
while its revenue components fell substantially. Such a transformation is only captured 
when firm revenues are the only output as the intermediation approach allows the 
introduction of total assets as an additional output to mask Barclays dwindling revenue 
figures. 
 A similar trend is evident when examining UBS as well, as model 2 again paints a 
more efficient picture of the Swiss based banking firm. While the firm is characterized by 
perfect efficiency in 2006 and 2007 across both models, UBS certainly took a hit in 2008 
as the firm’s non-interest revenue dropped by some 97% making the specific DMU an 
outlier within the initial sample. Following this rather significant drop in revenue the firm 
was able to recover according to the intermediation model (model 2) however the 
production model (model 1) displays a much different story, as UBS never returns to its 
pre-crisis levels of efficiency. As a result UBS, when analyzed under the production 
approach, can be labeled as the least efficient banking firm within the sample possessing 
efficiency scores that fall between 0.887 and 0.668 following the crisis. While the firm 
did increase revenue numbers from 2008 to 2009 the 6 years to follow would bring a 64% 
drop in total revenue along with a corresponding decrease in interest expense figures. 
This drop in revenue following the global crisis was primarily due to declining interest 
income figures as well, with non-interest revenue remaining relatively consistent year 
over year following the massive dip in 2008. Despite these figures UBS still does possess 
somewhat solid efficiency scores within model 2, as the firm’s asset base only took one 
significant hit in 2009 dropping almost 40%, translating to a technical efficiency score of 
just 0.749 during that same year. Following this one falter, UBS returns to higher levels 
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of efficiency under the assumptions of the intermediation approach in the latter portion of 
the decade, once again almost attaining perfect technical efficiency in 2011. 
 While UBS performed in the least efficient manner under the production method 
(model 1) over the span of the decade analyzed it could be argued that Morgan Stanley 
performed in a similar manner around the crisis years. The differing factor between the 
two firms, however, is the fact that this inefficient behavior that characterizes Morgan 
Stanley at times throughout the decade holds true across both models, unlike UBS who 
only saw dwindling efficiency scores under the assumptions of model 1. Entering into the 
crisis years Morgan Stanley not only possessed solid efficiency scores, the firm also 
achieved higher than average return on assets. Despite possessing one of the smaller 
assets bases the firm was also still able to maintain revenue figures that rivaled some of 
the larger firms in the sample, however this performance would waiver as Morgan 
Stanley moved through the global crisis. In 2009, for instance, the firm saw efficiency 
scores take a dive dropping below 0.800 across both models, only rebounding slightly by 
2010. These lower measures of technical efficiency would persist for a few years as well, 
until 2013 when Morgan Stanley began to claw its way back towards perfect efficiency. 
As the crisis years passed, a new revenue structure appeared to take hold as interest 
income fell and non-interest revenue increased year over year ultimately leading to 
perfect technical efficiency under both models in 2015. Like many of the firms analyzed 
this decrease in interest income was also mirrored by interest expense figures as Morgan 
Stanley diminished its interest expenses to the lowest level of any firm in the sample by 
2015. While theses changes did, in fact, result in higher efficiency scores they appear to 
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be the result of the firms diminishing asset base, as Morgan Stanley saw total assets fall 
by some 30% during the decade analyzed. 
 Despite this rather sharp drop in total assets, Morgan Stanley was not the smallest 
banking firm included within the sample, as Royal Bank of Canada held an asset base 
that was significantly smaller than that of its peers. While the Canadian firm was smaller 
on the basis of assets, much like Morgan Stanley, the trend that RBC’s asset based 
followed was much different, nearly doubling from 2006 to 2015. This growth in total 
assets coupled with extremely consistent revenue figures and decreasing expenses 
allowed Royal Bank of Canada to establish itself as one of the more efficient firms within 
the sample, even achieving perfect technical efficiency at times. Despite the fact that 
these results imply that RBC was operating in a profitable and efficient manner there is a 
significant issue known as efficiency by default that arises when applying a DEA analysis 
to the firm. The issue occurs due to the size of RBC as reflected through the firm’s 
smaller asset base, expenses and income components. According to Fried et al. (1993) 
efficiency by default can be determined in two different manners, both of which 
characterize several of the DMUs residing under Royal Bank of Canada. If a firm 
possesses the lowest input levels or the highest output levels, or if a firm is never or 
rarely utilized as an efficient peer, that specific DMU can be considered to be efficient by 
default. In the case of RBC the minimum input criteria is met due to the firm’s size and, 
as a result, the firm’s DMUs are often not utilized as efficient peers. This is not to say 
that RBC was an inefficient entity during the period analyzed, it just simply cannot be 
considered to be perfectly efficient at times despite displaying an efficiency score of 1.00. 
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 While efficient peer frequency allows for the detection of these firms 
characterized as efficient by default, the measure also allows for the identification of the 
DMUs or role models most often referenced by inefficient firms. The frequency by which 
these efficient DMUs are referenced can provide some insight as to which of the entities 
provides the best model for perfect technical efficiency. When analyzing each firm on an 
individual basis it is evident that frequently utilized peers seem to exist most often in 
2009, the year after the most severe portion of the financial crisis. Out of the 10 firms 
examined half of them find that their most frequently utilized efficient peer fell in the 
year 2009, while only 2 firms found their most frequently referenced peer to exist prior to 
or in 2008. This not only suggests that banking firms seemed to operate more efficiently 
following the crisis it illustrates that firms may have needed to practice efficient behavior 
in the initial year following the financial collapse in 2008. This is not to say that efficient 
DMUs that are referenced infrequently are worse off, it simply means that the most 
frequently utilized peers could be considered to be the paramount models of efficiency 
within the study. 
 While a DMU may achieve an efficiency score of 1.00 or perfect technical 
efficiency, some of these firms can still improve upon their level of efficiency as well. A 
firm that achieves perfect technical efficiency may only be Farrell efficient if a slack or 
surplus exists, as discussed previously and demonstrated through Figure 1. These slacks 
are able to provide even more insight beyond the information provided by a DMU’s 
efficiency score. Input slack, for instance, displays the degree to which a firm can reduce 
its input consumption while maintaining the same level of output. Figure 6 presented 
below illustrates these slacks across each of the four inputs utilized within this study, 
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noting the frequency of each slack or how many times a slack for a specific variable 
applies to a particular DMU. When taken as input in model 1, Assets exhibit the most 
frequent occurrence of slack amongst all of the variables demonstrating the fact that a 
large asset base is not necessarily vital to producing strong levels of output as exhibited 
by Wells Fargo and at times by Morgan Stanley both of whom possessed smaller asset 
 
 bases. Following Total Assets, Employees is the next most frequent occurrence of slack 
with approximately 20 incidents in each of the two models, suggesting that in many cases 
employees may be becoming more dispensable. With the development of new 
technologies the need for high employee counts may be a thing of the past, especially as 
certain processes within firms become automated. Non-Interest Expenses also sees a 
rather high rate of slack, however it is difficult to determine which component of these 
expenses is the most expendable. It could potentially be the massive salaries paid to the 
employees within the firm, however it could also be due to legal or other professional 
fees paid out to third parties.  
Aside from the frequency of these input slacks it is also interesting that both 
models mirror one another, as their slack frequencies pain the same picture. The same 





Figure 6: Input Slack Frequency  
Model 2 
Model 1  
	 36	
does not hold true when it comes to output slack however, as model 2 displays 
significantly higher frequencies than model 1 does as displayed by Figure 7 below. 
Output slacks as a whole occurs less frequently than input slacks however, but despite
 
this fact there are certainly still conclusions that can be drawn from the data. This graph, 
when evaluated in its entirety, tells an interesting story as the higher rate of output slack 
in model 2 suggests that under the assumptions of the intermediation approach more 
DMUs have room for output growth holding inputs constant. The degree of these output 
slacks can vary widely as well, with some firms possessing interest and non-interest 
slacks totaling less than $200 million while other firms have multi-billion dollar slacks 
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V. CONCLUSIONS & LIMITATIONS 
 Conclusions 
Based upon the data collected following the analysis, certain tentative conclusions 
can certainly be reached. Based upon the efficiency scores presented within Appendix A 
it is evident that the majority of banking firms achieved peak efficiency levels in the 
years following 2008. Furthermore, many of these firms begin to demonstrate 
consistently efficient behavior towards the latter portion of the decade analyzed 
suggesting that banking regulations and a need to operate in a more ethical manner 
potentially lead to higher levels of efficiency. Scores for technical efficiency were higher 
within model 2 (intermediation) on a regular basis as well, as the assignment of total as 
an output seems to have skewed the results in a manner that does not appear to convey 
the most accurate picture of efficiency. With that being said both models were certainly 
the victims of some shortcomings including the frequency of DMUs identified as 
efficient by default simply due to the firm size dissimilarities. 
 On a firm-by-firm basis there were undoubtedly certain banks that outperformed 
the majority of the sample including the likes of HSBC, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and JP 
Morgan along with others such as Bank of America and Barclays who performed 
efficiently during the crisis years. These results certainly coincided with the history of the 
era as well, as firms such as Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, Bearn Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers, were all acquired by the firms exhibiting the highest levels of efficiency around 
2008. There appeared to be no trend that developed amongst domestic or foreign banks 
either, as demonstrated by the mixture of banks that can be characterized as the most 
efficient firms in the sample. This reality is most likely due to the fact that lines are 
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becoming more blurred than ever when it comes to the conversation of foreign versus 
domestic firms, as the world’s largest banks all operate on a growing global scale. This is 
not to say that a more drastic presence with in specific nations will not carry certain 
connotations however. Just recently, for instance, on the 24th of May 2018 President 
Donald Trump signed a banking regulation rollback bill into affect, thus lifting “small” 
and “medium” sized banks out of a portion of their regulatory chains. While this does not 
directly affect the firms analyzed within this study at the moment there very well could 
be more legislation coming down the line in the future that may impact the globes largest 
firms and therefore alter the manner in which these banks behave. 
Extensions & Limitations 
 This analysis adds to the rather dated research that exists within the field of 
efficiency analyses regarding banking institutions. With the limited efficiency research 
that currently examines the global financial crisis of 2008 this study provides insight into 
how some of the world’s largest banking firms performed during the era stretching from 
2006 to 2015. A further analysis could delve deeper into the departments of each firm, or 
could examine firm efficiency within the boundaries of a specific country or region. 
Building upon this study could certainly prove useful, however there are certainly 
limitations that are bound to exist within the analysis. Differences in bank size, for 
instance, can lead to more frequent occurrences of efficiency by default, particularly in 
smaller firms. Despite this limitation DEA still is able to provide a practical and effective 
analysis of banking firms during the global financial crisis, able paint a picture of firm 
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Appendix A: DMU Efficiency Scores 
Sample Banking Firms Model 1 Model 2 
Year Firms  DMU Scores RTS Scores RTS 
2006 Bank of America 1 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2007 Bank of America 2 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2008 Bank of America 3 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2009 Bank of America 4 1.000 drs 1.000 drs 
2010 Bank of America 5 1.000 drs 1.000 drs 
2011 Bank of America 6 0.904 drs 0.926 drs 
2012 Bank of America 7 0.841 drs 0.884 drs 
2013 Bank of America 8 0.887 drs 0.914 drs 
2014 Bank of America 9 0.893 irs 0.921 drs 
2015 Bank of America 10 0.916 irs 0.952 drs 
2006 Barclays 11 0.920 irs 0.951 irs 
2007 Barclays 12 0.954 irs 0.996 irs 
2008 Barclays 13 0.961 irs 1.000 - 
2009 Barclays 14 0.897 irs 1.000 - 
2010 Barclays 15 0.847 irs 1.000 - 
2011 Barclays 16 0.739 irs 0.992 drs 
2012 Barclays 17 0.755 irs 0.990 drs 
2013 Barclays 18 0.710 irs 0.897 drs 
2014 Barclays 19 0.738 irs 1.000 - 
2015 Barclays 20 0.758 irs 0.958 irs 
2006 Citigroup 21 1.000 drs 0.967 drs 
2007 Citigroup 22 1.000 drs 1.000 drs 
2009 Citigroup 23 0.959 drs 0.948 drs 
2010 Citigroup 24 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2011 Citigroup 25 0.933 drs 0.937 drs 
2012 Citigroup 26 0.934 drs 0.933 drs 
2013 Citigroup 27 0.946 drs 0.954 drs 
2014 Citigroup 28 0.968 drs 0.958 drs 
2015 Citigroup 29 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2006 Goldman Sachs 30 1.000 - 1.000 irs 
2007 Goldman Sachs 31 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2008 Goldman Sachs 32 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2009 Goldman Sachs 33 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2010 Goldman Sachs 34 0.881 drs 0.973 drs 
2011 Goldman Sachs 35 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2012 Goldman Sachs 36 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2013 Goldman Sachs 37 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
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2014 Goldman Sachs 38 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2015 Goldman Sachs 39 0.946 irs 0.983 drs 
2006 HSBC 40 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2007 HSBC 41 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2008 HSBC 42 0.984 drs 1.000 drs 
2009 HSBC 43 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2010 HSBC 44 0.992 drs 0.994 drs 
2011 HSBC 45 0.962 drs 1.000 drs 
2012 HSBC 46 0.964 drs 0.994 drs 
2013 HSBC 47 1.000 drs 1.000 - 
2014 HSBC 48 0.911 drs 0.971 drs 
2015 HSBC 49 0.911 drs 0.971 drs 
2006 JP Morgan 50 0.948 drs 0.887 drs 
2007 JP Morgan 51 0.998 drs 0.959 drs 
2008 JP Morgan 52 0.922 - 0.951 drs 
2009 JP Morgan 53 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2010 JP Morgan 54 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2011 JP Morgan 55 0.948 drs 0.980 drs 
2012 JP Morgan 56 0.976 drs 0.979 drs 
2013 JP Morgan 57 1.000 drs 1.000 drs 
2014 JP Morgan 58 1.000 drs 1.000 - 
2015 JP Morgan 59 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2006 Morgan Stanley 60 0.992 irs 1.000 irs 
2007 Morgan Stanley 61 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2008 Morgan Stanley 62 1.000 - 0.922 irs 
2009 Morgan Stanley 63 0.719 irs 0.750 irs 
2010 Morgan Stanley 64 0.876 irs 0.856 drs 
2011 Morgan Stanley 65 1.000 irs 0.835 drs 
2012 Morgan Stanley 66 0.796 irs 0.778 drs 
2013 Morgan Stanley 67 0.910 drs 0.919 drs 
2014 Morgan Stanley 68 0.974 irs 0.963 drs 
2015 Morgan Stanley 69 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2006 RBC 70 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2007 RBC 71 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2008 RBC 72 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2009 RBC 73 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2010 RBC 74 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2011 RBC 75 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2012 RBC 76 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2013 RBC 77 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2014 RBC 78 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2015 RBC 79 1.000 irs 1.000 irs 
2006 UBS 80 1.000 - 1.000 - 
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2007 UBS 81 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2009 UBS 82 0.668 irs 0.749 irs 
2010 UBS 83 0.877 irs 0.951 irs 
2011 UBS 84 0.859 irs 0.996 drs 
2012 UBS 85 0.698 irs 0.904 drs 
2013 UBS 86 0.784 drs 0.883 drs 
2014 UBS 87 0.786 drs 0.954 drs 
2015 UBS 88 0.851 irs 0.908 drs 
2006 Wells Fargo 89 1.000 - 0.941 irs 
2007 Wells Fargo 90 0.994 irs 0.910 irs 
2008 Wells Fargo 91 1.000 irs 1.000 - 
2009 Wells Fargo 92 1.000 - 0.988 drs 
2010 Wells Fargo 93 1.000 - 0.954 drs 
2011 Wells Fargo 94 0.998 irs 0.936 drs 
2012 Wells Fargo 95 1.000 - 1.000 drs 
2013 Wells Fargo 96 1.000 - 0.997 drs 
2014 Wells Fargo 97 1.000 - 1.000 - 
2015 Wells Fargo 98 1.000 - 1.000 - 
  *RTS: Returns to scale that a given DMU is operating under. 
 
Appendix B: Efficient Peers 
Model 1 Model 2 
DMU Peers         DMU Peers         
1 1           1 1 
    
  
2 2 
    
  2 2 
    
  
3 3 
    
  3 3 
    
  
4 4 
    
  4 4 
    
  
5 5 
    
  5 5 
    
  
6 24 5 53 54 
 
  6 13 5 58 
  
  
7 24 5 54 
  
  7 54 58 5 
  
  
8 54 57 95 4 33   8 58 54 5 13 
 
  
9 98 59 54 53 33   9 53 13 58 33 
 
  
10 59 53 33 98 
 
  10 53 58 13 33 
 
  
11 73 43 3 1 72   11 1 13 41 80 76 73 
12 1 72 41 2 71   12 1 13 41 80 76 73 
13 3 2 40 72 
 
  13 13 
    
  
14 76 43 1 53 33   14 14 
    
  
15 78 98 43 53 33   15 15 
    
  
16 76 1 43 53 33   16 13 19 47 58 15   
17 53 78 43 98 33   17 13 19 47 58 15   
18 98 78 43 53 33   18 58 19 47 15 
 
  
19 53 79 98 33 
 
  19 19 
    
  
20 33 79 53 98 
 
  20 69 79 19 98 
 
  
21 21      21 22 4 41    
22 22       22 22       
23 22 24 2 92    23 22 13 42 4 24 81 
24 24       24 24       
25 22 92 24     25 5 45 53 24    
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26 92 53 54 24    26 45 24 5 53    
27 24 98 53 29    27 43 29 53 24    
28 24 54 53 92    28 98 53 54     
29 29       29 29       
30 30 
    
  30 30 
    
  
31 31 
    
  31 31 
    
  
32 32 
    
  32 32 
    
  
33 33 
    
  33 33 
    
  
34 4 57 33 
  




    
  35 35 
    
  
36 36 
    
  36 36 
    
  
37 37 
    
  37 37 
    
  
38 38 
    
  38 38 
    
  
39 38 69 33 
  




    
  40 40 
    
  
41 41 
    
  41 41 
    
  
42 22 41 4 24 
 
  42 42 
    
  
43 43 
    
  43 43 
    
  
44 4 43 53 47 
 
  44 47 53 4 45 43   
45 41 4 53 43 
 
  45 45 
    
  
46 33 47 4 53 43   46 13 47 45 4 58 53 
47 47 
    
  47 47 
    
  
48 4 47 43 53 
 
  48 13 47 45 58 
 
  
49 33 43 47 53 98   49 58 13 19 47 
 
  
50 1 31 21 92 
 
  50 41 80 31 1 53   
51 1 81 4 31 21   51 1 4 80 81 53   
52 3 1 61 81 24   52 22 13 5 81 24   
53 53 
    
  53 53 
    
  
54 54 
    
  54 54 
    
  
55 4 54 5 
  
  55 54 58 5 53 
 
  
56 4 54 57 58 
 




    
  57 57 
    
  
58 58 
    
  58 58 
    
  
59 59 
    
  59 59 
    
  
60 80 70 30 61 
 
  60 60 
    
  
61 61 
    
  61 61 
    
  
62 62 
    
  62 75 53 61 30 32   
63 70 33 69 73 
 
  63 14 38 33 13 
 
  
64 65 33 69 70 
 




    
  65 47 4 33 58 
 
  
66 33 69 65 70 
 
  66 38 15 33 69 
 
  
67 33 69 95 
  
  67 33 38 58 69 
 
  
68 33 69 65 
  




    
  69 69 
    
  
70 70 
    
  70 70 
    
  
71 71 
    
  71 71 
    
  
72 72 
    
  72 72 
    
  
73 73 
    
  73 73 
    
  
74 74 
    
  74 74 
    
  
75 75 
    
  75 75 
    
  
76 76 
    
  76 76 
    
  
77 77 
    
  77 77 
    
  
78 78 
    
  78 78 
    
  
79 79 
    
  79 79 
    
  
80 80 
    
  80 80 
    
  
81 81 
    
  81 81 
    
  
	 45	
82 1 80 30 33 76   82 13 32 30 31 37   
83 30 33 70 
  
  83 13 80 33 70 
 
  
84 80 41 33 76 73   84 31 37 33 13 
 
  
85 53 30 1 33 75   85 38 15 33 13 
 
  
86 41 43 4 33 
 
  86 13 38 33 15 
 
  
87 53 95 4 33 
 
  87 13 38 33 15 
 
  
88 33 79 43 98 
 




    
  89 29 91 73 43 
 
  




    
  91 91 
    
  
92 92 
    




    
  93 24 98 53 
  
  
94 93 73 95 69 
 




    
  95 95 
    
  
96 96 
    




    
  97 97 
    
  
98 98       98 98       
 
Appendix C: Efficient Peer Frequency 
Model 1 
DMU Freq. DMU Freq. DMU Freq. DMU Freq. 
1 10 26 0 51 0 76 4 
2 3 27 0 52 0 77 0 
3 3 28 0 53 20 78 3 
4 12 29 1 54 8 79 3 
5 3 30 5 55 0 80 3 
6 0 31 2 56 0 81 2 
7 0 32 0 57 3 82 0 
8 0 33 26 58 1 83 0 
9 0 34 0 59 2 84 0 
10 0 35 0 60 0 85 0 
11 0 36 0 61 2 86 0 
12 0 37 0 62 0 87 0 
13 0 38 1 63 0 88 0 
14 0 39 0 64 0 89 1 
15 0 40 1 65 3 90 0 
16 0 41 5 66 0 91 0 
17 0 42 0 67 0 92 6 
18 0 43 13 68 0 93 1 
19 0 44 0 69 7 94 0 
20 0 45 0 70 5 95 4 
21 2 46 0 71 1 96 0 
22 3 47 4 72 3 97 0 
23 0 48 0 73 5 98 10 
24 10 49 0 74 0 - - 




DMU Freq. DMU Freq. DMU Freq. DMU Freq. 
1 4 26 0 51 0 76 2 
2 0 27 0 52 0 77 0 
3 1 28 0 53 16 78 0 
4 7 29 4 54 5 79 1 
5 7 30 2 55 0 80 5 
6 0 31 3 56 0 81 3 
7 0 32 2 57 1 82 0 
8 0 33 17 58 17 83 0 
9 0 34 0 59 0 84 0 
10 0 35 0 60 0 85 0 
11 0 36 0 61 1 86 0 
12 0 37 3 62 0 87 0 
13 21 38 10 63 0 88 0 
14 1 39 0 64 0 89 0 
15 9 40 0 65 0 90 0 
16 0 41 4 66 0 91 1 
17 0 42 1 67 0 92 0 
18 0 43 6 68 0 93 0 
19 5 44 0 69 7 94 0 
20 0 45 5 70 1 95 1 
21 0 46 0 71 0 96 0 
22 3 47 8 72 0 97 1 
23 0 48 0 73 4 98 5 
24 7 49 0 74 0   -   - 
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